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ABSTRACT 
 
We study the morning commute problem with a peak period flat toll, where the toll has a maximum 
acceptable toll level and a maximum acceptable length of tolling period. Under such a constrained 
optimization setup, we investigate the system cost minimization problem. A tolling scheme is 
determined by the toll starting time, the toll ending time, and the toll level. The toll starting time 
and ending time are set before and after the common work start time, respectively. We find out 
that, under the toll window length constraint only, a balanced toll window design is always optimal, 
where “balanced” means that the part of the toll window before the work start time and the part 
after have equal monetary value. Under both the toll level and the toll window length constraints, 
the balanced design is optimal if feasible; otherwise the toll should start later with the same toll 
window length. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent decades, the problems stemming from high vehicle ownership and heavy road usage has 
become much starker. These problems include road congestion, pavement damage, air pollution, 
traffic accidents and limited parking places. As a result, road pricing has been widely implemented 
all over the world. The world's first congestion tolling scheme was introduced in Singapore's core 
central business district (CBD) in 1975 as the Singapore Area Licensing Scheme (ALS). The roads 
leading to the CBD are tolled. If a driver wants to enter the CBD, she needs to purchase a special 
paper license which is sold at post offices, gas stations or convenience stores, on a monthly or 
daily basis. The toll gate at the entrance of the CBD are gantries where police officers are visually 
checking the license and recording any violations. The ALS was upgraded to 100% free-
flowing Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) system in September 1998. Sensors are installed on the 
gantries to communicate with an In-vehicle Unit (IU) to implement the charging. The IU is a device 
to insert a cash card to pay the toll. When a car drives under a gantry, the sensors on the gantry 
will work with the IU to deduct the money in the cash card automatically. Each registered car 
intending to enter the CBD is enforced to install an IU by law. Actually, before Singapore’s 
implementation of ERP, Hong Kong experimented the ERP system during 1983 to 1985. The 
results demonstrated the technical feasibility of this tolling system, but it was aborted due to the 
public opposition. In Europe, Norway implemented a cordon tolling scheme in the city of Bergen 
(1986), Oslo (1990) and Trondheim (1991). The Oslo toll ring is a classic cordon pricing scheme 
with 19 toll stations circling the centre of Oslo. People driving into the city need to pay a fee when 
they pass the cordon line. The toll stations support electronic payment without reducing vehicle’s 
speed. The cordon tolling scheme makes every car entering the city centre have to pass a toll station, 
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so the city centre’s traffic congestion can be effectively alleviated. The collected toll is intended 
to improve road network and finance road construction projects. Sweden introduced Stockholm 
congestion tax that covers Stockholm city centre in August 2007. All the entrances and exits of 
the centre area have unmanned control points operating with automatic number plate recognition. 
Vehicles entering this are during the peak hours need to pay a fixed fee. The congestion tax 
collected from commuters is also used to construct and maintain the toll roads. US first introduced 
the High-occupancy toll lane (HOT lane) system in 1995 on California’s 91 express lanes. In next 
year, Interstate 15, north of San Diego, also started to implement the HOT tolling scheme. The 
HOT lane is a traffic lane that is only free to high-occupancy vehicles and designated exempt 
vehicles. The high occupancy vehicle usually is the vehicle with at least 2 or 3 occupants. Other 
vehicles intending to use the lane need to pay a toll. If the driver does not like to pay the toll, she 
can also use the general untolled lane. The toll level is displayed at the entry of the lanes, which is 
adjusted according to the travel demand to control traffic volume to ensure the minimum traffic 
speed and service level. 
 
In urban area, during the morning commute peak hours, heavy congestion at road’s bottleneck has 
now become an unneglectable problem for the commuters. It is very common to hear one’s 
colleague complaining how long she has to wait on the road. Since no one would like to come to 
workplace too early or can afford the penalty of being late, travelers usually depart from home at 
approximately same time periods. At the road’s bottleneck section, due to its capacity limit to 
handle the travel demand, congestion is inevitable. Motivated by this problem, this thesis proposes 
a tolling scheme implemented during morning commute peak hours. Our purpose is to alleviate 
the road congestion caused by the excessive traffic flow through charging a coarse toll at the road’s 
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bottleneck area which usually has very limited capacity. We choose to charge a coarse toll because 
of its easiness to implement. The dynamic toll or the time-varying toll can cause confusion to the 
commuter, as the commuter may not know when she should depart from home. In this thesis, the 
bottleneck model is built based on the concept of equilibrium. At equilibrium, no commuter can 
further reduce her travel cost by altering the arrival time at the bottleneck. By levying a toll on the 
bottleneck, the equilibrium profile of commuters could have a tremendous change compared with 
the no-toll scenario. Considering that the toll has a maximum public acceptable level and the tolling 
period has a maximum public acceptable length, we investigate the problem of system cost 
minimization and our goal is to find the optimal tolling scheme under these two constraints. Under 
the optimal tolling scheme, commuters have the minimum total system cost. It could also be 
understood as the best equilibrium profile of all profiles. Under such a constrained optimization 
setup, we first solve the equilibrium of the bottleneck model. We find out that, for any toll window, 
there exists a critical toll level over which capacity waste can happen. Capacity waste is a time 
period during which, no commuter uses the bottleneck. Then, based on the individual cost, we 
prove, in respect of total system cost, a tolling scheme without capacity waste is always better than 
a scheme with capacity waste. We also find out that, under toll window length constraint only, if 
the unconstrained optimal tolling scheme is infeasible, we should push toll window length to the 
upper bound, make toll window balanced and charge the corresponding critical toll price. Balanced 
means the part of the toll window before the work start time and the part after has equal monetary 
value. Under both toll level and toll window length constraints, if the unconstrained optimal tolling 
scheme is infeasible, whenever possible, a balanced toll window and its corresponding critical toll 
price can solve the problem; if the balanced design gives a critical toll price exceeding the upper 
bound of toll level, we can push the toll window rightward to make the tolling time start later, or 
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namely make the toll window unbalanced, and charge the corresponding critical toll price of the 
moved toll window. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter two, we do a literature review to 
show the previous researches of the road bottleneck model. In chapter three, we review the 
equilibrium of untolled bottleneck model. Chapter four gives a complete picture of tolled 
bottleneck model, where we investigated the equilibrium profiles of different tolling schemes. In 
chapter five, we solve the unconstrained system cost optimization problem based on the individual 
cost. In chapter six, we solve the constrained system cost optimization problem given both toll 
level and toll window length constraints. In chapter seven, we use numerical examples to 
demonstrate the proposed optimal tolling schemes under different constraint setups. Concluding 
remarks are offered in chapter eight. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
To model the morning commute problem, Vickery first introduced the road bottleneck model in 
1969 (Vickery 1969). Hendrickson and Kocur (1981) reviewed the no-toll equilibrium of 
bottleneck model with and without no lateness assumption. They also investigated the distribution 
of work start times and pointed out that the condition of equilibrium is that the arrival rate of 
commuters must be constant. As bottleneck model’s pioneers, Arnott et al. (1988) extend 
Vickery’s model by assuming different work starting times. They investigated users’ no-toll 
equilibrium profile and showed that, for two groups of commuters, the queue at the bottleneck can 
be single peaked, double peaked or the rush hour can be separate based on the work starting times’ 
difference. Arnott et al. (1990) pointed out by levying a flat toll during the commuting period, 
travelers’ total system cost can be reduced and under the optimal tolling scheme, there should be 
no queue at the toll window’s endpoints. Arnott et al. (1993) extended Vickery’s model further by 
assuming elastic demand and found the optimal road capacity under various pricing regimes. 
Arnott et al. (1994) examined the welfare effects of the optimal time-varying toll. In their model, 
the commuters are divided into several groups, each group with its own unique VOT but shares 
same relative cost of late to early arrival. Under the time-varying toll, queue is completely 
eliminated but such a tolling scheme depends on each group’s VOT and travel demand. In real 
world it is very inconvenient to implement and can also be quite confusing to commuters, besides 
their model does not consider continuous VOT distribution either. Further effort was made to 
reduce commuters’ queuing delay at the bottleneck, such as Laih (1994) proposed a multi-step 
tolling scheme where different flat tolls are levied on different time periods during the peak hour. 
The flat toll scheme is easier to implement but Laih’s model is limited by the assumption that the 
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flat toll does not change commuter’s travel cost (compared with no-toll equilibrium). Although 
under the optimal time-varying toll, the toll revenue equals the saved queuing cost, it is usually 
not true under a flat toll. Lindsey (2004) reviewed previous bottleneck models under assumption 
of multiple user classes and proved the existence and uniqueness of user equilibrium of bottleneck 
model. Xiao et al. (2011) extended Arnott’s model (1990) by providing details of how the queuing 
profile changes with respect to toll level under heterogeneous VOT assumption. They formulate a 
non-linear optimization problem to solve the equilibrium and find out the optimal tolling scheme. 
Under their optimal tolling scheme, no queue exists at toll window’s endpoints either. This is 
mainly due to the proportional assumption of user’s VOT. Xiao et al. (2013) extend Arnott’s model 
(1994) by assuming continuous VOT distribution, where social optimum is also achieved by a 
dynamic tolling scheme. Under his model, the toll level only depends on each commuters’ VOT 
and does not require dividing travelers into groups, which can save some work but such a dynamic 
tolling scheme also suffers from inconvenience of implementing.  
 
Based on our literature review, none of the existing works studied the constrained optimization 
problem of a tolled bottleneck. For public acceptable issue, we consider that the toll has a 
maximum acceptable toll level and a maximum acceptable length of tolling period, both 
exogenously given, so a constrained system optimization problem can be proposed. In this thesis, 
we still use flat toll for our tolling scheme as it is easy to be implemented in real world. We will 
solve the constrained system cost optimization problem given both toll level and toll window 
length constraints and establish the properties of the optimal tolling schemes.   
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3. Equilibrium of Untolled Single Bottleneck 
 
During the morning commute peak hours, at some busy roads, we can easily observe travelers 
stuck by heavy congestion. This is usually due to most commuters have roughly same work starting 
time but the capacity of the road cannot satisfy such high travel demand. In order to model this 
phenomenon, bottleneck model is introduced. In this section, we will briefly review the 
equilibrium of untolled single bottleneck during the morning commute period for users with 
heterogeneous VOT. 
*t  is assumed to be commuters’ preferred arrival time at work.  If a 
commuter arrives at work before 
*t , she will be incurred a schedule early delay cost  . If she 
arrives at work later than 
*t  she will be incurred a schedule late delay cost  . The queuing delay 
cost is denoted by  . We assume    and   , where   and   are constants 
 0 1    . The x th user’s VOT  x  is assumed to be a monotonically decreasing function 
with respect to x . The total number of commuters is assumed to be N . The bottleneck’s capacity 
is s . The arrival rate is denoted by  . When commuter’s arrival rate is higher than s , a queue 
will develop at the bottleneck. When commuter’s arrival rate is lower than s , the queue at the 
bottleneck will gradually dissipate. Since   and   are both constants, the profile of the no-toll 
equilibrium should be pretty similar with the equilibrium profile under homogeneous VOT 
assumption. At equilibrium, the arrival rates of commuters having schedule early and late delay 
can be obtained as both constants, implying the traveler’s position in the queue is random. Since 
we assume commuters value schedule late delay more than schedule early delay, we can see in 
figure 1 the arrival rate of commuters having schedule early delay is much higher than that of 
commuters having schedule late delay. The morning commute period starts at qt  and ends at qt  . 
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We can obtain  * qt t N s      and  
*
qt t N s      . Figure 1 shows the untolled 
single bottleneck equilibrium profile of users having heterogeneous VOT. (See Appendix A for 
details)  
 
 
                                                   Figure 1: untolled single bottleneck equilibrium profile 
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4. Equilibrium of Tolled Single Bottleneck 
 
In this section we will talk about the equilibrium of tolled single bottleneck with commuters having 
heterogeneous VOT. A flat toll p  is imposed from t

 to t

. Our tolling scheme only assumes 
*t t t   . At equilibrium no traveler can further reduce her travel cost by adjusting her arrival 
time at the bottleneck. Since the flat toll has no impact on toll payers’ travel time choice, the arrival 
pattern of toll payers having schedule early delay or late delay should be similar with those under 
the profile of untolled single bottleneck. As the toll non-payer who arrives before t

 is incurred a 
schedule early delay cost, her arrival rate should be similar with that of the toll payer who also has 
schedule early delay cost. The arrival rate of travelers having schedule early delay can be obtained 
as 1s  . The arrival rate of travelers having schedule late delay can be obtained as 1s  .  
 
 
 
 
qt  
t  
t   t

 
yt
 
zt  
*t  
mt  
qt   
cumulative 
arrivals and 
departures 
t  
Figure 2: equilibrium profile of tolled bottleneck without capacity waste 
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When the toll window length is not too long and toll level is not too high, the bottleneck can be 
fully utilized with no capacity waste. Here capacity waste means a period during which no queue 
exists at the bottleneck between the arrival time of the first and last commuter. The x th commuter 
is assumed to be the toll non-payer arriving before t

, her travel cost can be given by 
   
   
 
   1 1
*,
q q
t t
q q
t t
d s t t d s t t
C x t x x t t
s s
     
 
    
 
    
 
 
 
 
At equilibrium, we can obtain 
     *, qC x t x t t   (1) 
As the bottleneck is fully utilized, the first toll payer should come no later than t

. The y th 
commuter is assumed to be the toll payer who experiences schedule early delay, her cost can be 
given by 
   
     
 
     
1 2
1 2
*
,
q y
q y
t t
q
t t
t t
q
t t
d d s t t
C y t y
s
d d s t t
y t t p
s
     

     

  

   
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
where t  is the arrival time of the last toll non-payer arriving before t

. 
yt  is the arrival time of 
first toll payer. At equilibrium, we can obtain 
        *, yC y t y t t y t t p        (2) 
The last toll payer should arrive no later than t

. The z th commuter is assumed to be the toll payer 
who experiences schedule late delay, her cost can be given by 
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   
       
 
       
1 2 3
1 2 3
*
,
z
q y z
z
q y z
t t t
q
t t t
t t t
q
t t t
d d d s t t
C z t z
s
d d d s t t
z t t p
s
        

        

   

    
 
    
 
 
  
  
 
where traveler who arrives at 
zt  experiences no schedule early or late delay, since she is cleared 
just at 
*t . At equilibrium, we can obtain 
    *, zC z t z t t p    
Mass arrival happens right after the arrival time of the last toll payer. We denote it by 
mt . Every 
commuter in the mass arrival is assumed to experience an average queuing delay and schedule late 
delay of the total mass. The travel cost of commuter in the mass arrival can be given by 
      *,
2 2
q q
m m
t t t t
C m t m t m t 
 
     
         
   
 
At equilibrium, the indifferent user is the commuter who can arrive at any time as she is always 
incurred identical travel cost. For those who have higher VOT than the indifferent user, they will 
pay the toll to pass the bottleneck. For those who have lower VOT than the indifferent user, they 
will avoid the toll by coming earlier or later. The toll price can be easily obtained as the queuing 
cost difference of the indifferent user arriving at t  and 
yt  respectively, thus we have 
   yp s t t t t        
From 
   
1
q q
s
t t s t t

  

 
   *
1
z y
s
t t s t t

  

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   *
1
m z
s
t t s t t

  

 
q q
N
t t
s
    
we can further obtain 
 
   
2
1
q
p N
t t
ss t t 

 
  
   
 (3) 
 
 1
2 1
1
2 2
y q
N
t
s
t t t

 



 
          
   *
2 1
1
2 2
m q
N
t
st t t
 
  
 
 
      
From (3), we can see when toll price is increased, the first commuter will postpone her arrival. 
Since the first commuter has postponed her arrival, the first and last toll payer will also postpone 
their arrivals or we can say the equilibrium profile will move rightward. When toll price is 
increased to a certain level, the first toll payer will arrive exactly at t

 or the last toll payer will 
arrive exactly at t

. At this moment, if we keep increasing the toll level, capacity waste will occur 
at t

or t

. By setting yt t
 , we can obtain 
 
   
1
1
2 1
s t t N
p t t
s
  
 
 
 
        
   
 (4) 
If toll window is designed as    * *t t t t     , t t N s    and toll level is kept within  
10 p p  , the bottleneck will be fully utilized. This corresponds to area AOD in figure 2. By 
setting 
mt t
 , we can obtain 
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     *2
1
2 1
N
p s t t t t
s

   
 
               
 (5) 
If toll window is designed as    * *t t t t     ,  *t t N s       and toll level is kept 
within 
20 p p  , the bottleneck will be fully utilized. This corresponds to area ODF in figure 2. 
 
If toll window is designed balanced as    * *t t t t     , we have 1 2p p . If toll level is 
pushed to 
1p  or 2p , the first and last toll payer will arrive exactly at t

 and t

, which implies no 
queue exists at the endpoints of the toll window. This corresponds to line OD  in figure 2. 
 
When toll level exceeds 
1p  or 2p , depending on the design of toll window, capacity waste will 
start to occur at t

, t

or even at both t

and t

. If the toll window satisfies    * *t t t t     , 
when toll level is pushed above 
1p , capacity waste will only occur at t

. Using the same logic, if 
the toll window is designed as    * *t t t t     , when toll level exceeds 2p , we will observe 
capacity waste only at t

. Of course, for the design of    * *t t t t     , when toll price 
surpasses 
1p  or 2p , capacity waste will occur at both t

 and t

. 
 
If capacity waste only exists at t

, during  , yt t  no queue exists at the bottleneck. From the 
standpoint of the indifferent user we can easily obtain the toll price as the travel cost difference of 
her coming as the first toll non-payer and first toll payer respectively, thus we have 
   y qp N t t     
14 
 
where  is the proportion of toll payers. The N th commuter is namely the indifferent user. She 
has the lowest VOT among the toll payers but the highest VOT among the toll non-payers. The 
toll price is simply the schedule early delay difference of her coming at these two moments. Based 
on the fundamental equilibrium relations, we can obtain  
  *m
N
t t t t
s

         
 
1
2
1 2
N N
p N t t
s s
 
  
 
       
   
 
where 
 
y
N
t t
s
    
It is shown the toll price is a function of toll payers’ proportion. When toll level is raised up, the 
indifferent user’s VOT will increase. As fewer people can afford the toll, toll payers can gain more 
time choice freedom. The last toll payer is going to postpone her arrival by arriving closer to t

. 
When toll price is raised to a certain level, the last toll payer will arrive exactly at t

. By setting 
mt t
 , we have 
       * * *3
1
2
1 2
N
p s t t t t t t
s
  
    
  
                   
 (6) 
If the toll window is designed as    * *t t t t     , t t N s    and toll price is kept within  
1 3p p p  , capacity waste only occurs at t

. This corresponds to area AOD in figure 2. 
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When toll level exceeds 
3p , capacity waste will also occur at t

. If we have capacity waste at t

, 
since there is no queue, the mass arrival should happen exactly at t

. If we denote 
zt  as the last 
toll payer’s arrival time, from the standpoint of the indifferent user, we should have 
   * *y zt t t t     
This implies the first toll payer’s schedule early delay equals the last toll payer’s schedule late 
delay. The toll price can be obtained as    
 
 
 
2
*
1 2 2 2 2 2 3
1 2 1 1
z y z
N
p s t t t t t t
s
        

     
 
     
              
 
where  z ys t t     is the indifferent user’s VOT.  
 
It is easy to understand when toll price is pushed high enough, only the zeroth person (commuter 
with highest VOT) can afford the toll to pass the bottleneck. The rest commuters have to come 
either before t

, or after t

. It is obvious the zeroth commuter should arrive exactly at 
*t , since 
she will not be incurred any schedule delay cost. Such a toll price can be obtained by setting *
zt t . 
By setting *
zt t , we can obtain   
  
  *
4
1 2 1
0
1 2 1 1
N
p t t t
s
   

   
       
    
 (7) 
By setting 
zt t
 , we can obtain 
      * * *
1
2
1 2
N
p s t t t t t t
s
  
    
  
                   
 
If the toll window is designed as    * *t t t t     , t t N s    and toll level is kept within  
3 4p p p  , capacity waste occurs at both t

 and t

. (Figure 2 area AOD ) 
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When toll price is greater than 
4p , no commuter can afford the toll, all of them arrive either before 
t   or join the mass arrival at t

. (Figure 2 area AOD ) 
 
Now let us talk about capacity waste only existing at t

. If the toll window design satisfies 
   * *t t t t     , when toll level exceeds 2p , capacity waste will only occur at t

. Since 
there is no queue between 
zt  and t

, mass arrival will happen exactly at t

. The toll price can be 
obtained as the indifferent user’s travel cost difference of her coming at 
qt  and yt  respectively, 
thus we have 
      q yp N t t N t t          
The toll price can be understood as the travel cost difference of indifferent user arriving as the first 
toll non-payer and first toll payer respectively. Based on the fundamental equilibrium relations, 
we can obtain  
   * *y zt t t t t t        
   
2
*2 1 31
2 1 2 2 2
N N
p N t t t
s s
        
  
    
               
    
 
where 
 
z
N
t t
s
    
We can see the toll price is a function of toll payers’ proportion. When toll price is increased, the 
indifferent user’s VOT will correspondingly increase. As fewer people can afford the toll, the toll 
payers can gain more time choice freedom. The first toll payer will postpone her arrival by arriving 
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closer to t

. Finally when toll price is increased to a certain level, the first toll payer will arrive 
exactly at t

 and at this moment if we keep raising the toll level, capacity waste will also occur at 
t  . By setting yt t
 , we could obtain 
    
 
 
2 2 2
* * *
5
2 3
2 1 2 1 2 1
N
p s t t t t t t
s
         

       
  
      
                
 (8) 
If toll window is designed as    * *t t t t     ,  *t t N s       and toll level is kept 
within 2 5p p p  , capacity waste only occurs at t

. This corresponds to area ODF in figure 2. 
 
When toll level exceeds
5p , capacity waste will also occur at t

. Using the same logic, we can see 
if toll level is kept within 5 4p p p  , capacity waste occurs at both t

 and t

. (Figure 2 area 
ODF ) 
 
When toll price is higher than 
4p , no commuters will use the toll window. All of them will arrive 
either before t

 or after t

. (Figure 2 area ODF ) 
 
For the balanced toll window design, we have 1 2 3 5p p p p   , so when toll level exceeds 1p  but 
under
4p , capacity waste occurs at both t

 and t

. When toll level exceeds 
4p ,  all commuters 
will arrive either before t

 or after t

. (Figure 2 line OD ) 
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Figure 3: complete tolled single bottleneck equilibrium profile 
 
The following equations are the lines in figure 3. 
   * *:OH t t t t     ,     * *:
N
CG t t t t
s
       ,   : ,
N N
D
s s
 
   
 
 
  
 
   * *
1
:
2
N
BK t t t t
s

  

    ,     * *:
N
AD t t t t
s
      
     
2
* *: 2 1
N
BD t t t t
s
   
 

         ,     * *:
N
CD t t t t
s
 
 
      
 
The equilibrium profile is not only restricted to what we have discussed above. In the following, 
we will give a full picture of commuter’s equilibrium patterns. (See Appendix B for details) We 
let 
 
 
 
6
1 12
1 2 1 2 1 2
N s N
p t t t t
s
  

     
              
        
 
 
 
 * *7
N
p s t t t t
s
  
  
 
        
   
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   
 
 * * * *8
2 N
p s t t s t t N t t t t
s
   

    
                         
 
 
 
*
9
N
p N t t
s

 
 

 
     
 
  *10 0
N
p t t
s
  
 
   
 
 
       
2
* * * *
11
N
p s t t s t t N t t t t
s
 
  
 
               
   
 
   * *12
1
2
N
p s t t t t
s
    

 
            
   
 
   
  
   
 
  
 
* *
13
2 2
* *
2 2
1 1
1 2 2
1 1
s s
p N t t t t
N
t t t t
s
 

 
       
       
 
 
 
       
   
     
     
   *14
1
0
2
N
p t t
s

  
 
   
 
 
 
 
*
15
N
p N t t
s

 
 

 
     
 
In area ADB : when 60 p p  , no commuter arrives before t

, no capacity waste occurs at t

, 
mass arrival occurs before or at t

; when 
6 3p p p  , commuter arrives before t

, capacity waste 
only occurs at t

, mass arrival occurs before or at  t

; when 3 4p p p  , commuter arrives before 
t  , capacity waste occurs at both t

 and t

, mass arrival occurs at  t

. 
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In area CDJ : when 70 p p  , bottleneck can be fully utilized but has no mass arrival; when
7 8p p p  , capacity waste only occurs at t

 and there is no mass arrival; when
8 4p p p  , mass 
arrival recurs at t

, capacity waste occurs at both t

 and t

. 
 
In area GJDH : when 9 8p p p  , capacity waste only occurs at t

 and there is no mass arrival; 
when 
8 4p p p  , mass arrival recurs at t

, capacity waste occurs at both t

 and t

. 
 
In area PCJI : when 70 p p  , bottleneck can be fully utilized but has no mass arrival; when 
7 10p p p  , capacity waste only occurs at t

 and there is no mass arrival. 
 
In area IJG : when 9 10p p p  , capacity waste only occurs at t

 and there is no mass arrival. 
 
In area CFD : when 110 p p  , bottleneck can be fully utilized but has no mass arrival; when 
11 5p p p  , capacity waste only occurs at t

 and mass arrival occurs at t

; when 5 4p p p  , 
capacity waste occurs at both t

 and t

, mass arrival occurs at t

.   
 
In area LDB : when 120 p p  , no commuter arrives before t

, no capacity waste occurs at t

  
and mass arrival occurs before or at t

; when 
12 13p p p  , no commuter arrives before t

, 
capacity waste occurs at t

 and mass arrival occurs at t

; when 13 4p p p  , commuter arrives 
before t

, mass arrival occurs at t

, capacity waste occurs at both t

 and t

. 
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In area NLBM : when 120 p p  , no commuter arrives before t

, no capacity waste occurs at t

 
and mass arrival occurs before or at t

; when 
12 14p p p  , no commuter arrives before t

, 
capacity waste occurs at t

 and mass arrival occurs at t

. 
 
In area HDLK : when 15 13p p p  , no commuter arrives before t

, capacity waste occurs at t

 
and mass arrival occurs at t

; when 13 4p p p  , commuter arrives before t

, mass arrival occurs 
at t

, capacity waste occurs at both t

 and t

. 
 
In area KLN : when 15 14p p p  , no commuter arrives before t

, capacity waste occurs at t

 
and mass arrival occurs at t

. 
 
In area GCOBK : when 4p p , no commuter uses the toll window, all of them arrive either before 
t   or join the mass arrival at t

. 
 
In area KBM : when 14p p , no commuter uses the toll window, all of them join the mass arrival 
at t

. 
 
In area PCG : when 10p p , no commuter uses the toll window, all of them come before t

. 
 
In area HDN : when 150 p p  , every commuter pays the toll to pass the bottleneck. 
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In area IDH : when 90 p p  , every commuter pays the toll to pass the bottleneck. 
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5. Unconstrained Optimization Problem 
 
In previous section, we have solved the equilibrium of tolled single bottleneck. In this section, we 
will talk about the unconstrained optimization problem. Unconstrained means there is no constraint 
on toll price level or toll window length. The goal is to minimize commuters’ total queuing delay 
and total schedule delay. The toll revenue collected from toll payers can be regarded as tax paid to 
the government, so minimizing the toll revenue is not our concern. Before our discussion, a lemma 
is introduced: 
 
Lemma 1. For any tolling scheme with capacity waste, by shortening toll window length and 
reducing toll price, there exists a tolling scheme with no capacity waste and incurring less total 
cost. (See Appendix C for proof)  
 
The proof of this lemma is complicated but we can understand it in an easy way. The capacity 
waste happens at t

 when toll price exceeds 
1p  or at t

 when toll price exceeds 
2p . If we still 
want to retain same amount of toll payers, the only way is to stretch the toll window longer, so the 
original toll payers with relatively lower VOT would still stay within the toll window, because 
coming earlier for them to avoid the toll would incur a higher schedule early cost. If we reverse 
this process, for a toll window with capacity waste, we could shorten the toll window length to the 
clearing period of toll payers (from the first toll payer’s clearing time point to last toll payer’s 
clearing time point) and reduce the toll price to a certain level so the same amount of toll payers 
would still use the tolled bottleneck. As the amount of toll payers does not change, the total queuing 
and schedule delay of toll payers will not change either. But by shortening the toll window length, 
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the toll non-payers at least can incur less schedule early cost, so the total cost of all commuters 
will decrease. 
 
Substituting (3) into (1) and (2) gives us 
         
  
* 2,
1
N p
C x t x x t t x
s N
  
  
   

 (9) 
         
 
  
*
2 1
,
1
pN
C y t y y t t y p
s N
 
  
  
      

 (10) 
(9) and (10) show that, for a fixed toll window, the higher the toll price is charged, the lower a 
commuter’s cost will be, so for any toll window design, we need to push toll level to 
1p  or 2p  to 
achieve the minimal cost.   
 
If the toll window design satisfies    * *t t t t     , by setting toll price to 1p , we can obtain 
         *
2
,
2 1
N N
C x t x x t t x t t
s s

  
 
         
   
 (11) 
      *,C y t y t t p      (12) 
If the toll window design satisfies    * *t t t t     , by setting toll price to 2p , we can obtain 
    
 
 
  *
1 1
,
2 1 2 1
N
C x t x x t t
s
 
 
   
   
   
 (13) 
      *,C y t y t t p      (14) 
If the toll window design satisfies    * *t t t t     , by setting toll price to 1p  or 2p , the 
commuters’ travel cost can be expressed by either form of the unbalanced design. 
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In this section, our goal is to achieve the unstrained optimality, so we do not need to worry about 
the toll level or toll window length. As shown above, there are three different designs of toll 
window, so our concern is which one will incur the lowest cost. The logic is to pick up a toll 
window, design it in three different ways, by comparing the individual user’s travel cost, we can 
find the best design. 
 
Let us first compare the design of    * *t t t t      and    * *t t t t      , where 
t t t t N s        . We readily have 
* Nt t
s
 
 
  

,  *
N
t t
s
 
 
  

 
* Nt t
s
 
 
 

,  *
N
t t
s
 
 
 

 
Based on (11) and (12), we can see the balanced design is better. 
 
Now let us compare the design of    * *t t t t      and    * *t t t t      , where 
t t t t N s        . We readily have 
* Nt t
s
 
 
  

,  *
N
t t
s
 
 
  

 
Based on (13) and (14), we can see the balanced design is still better, so for the unconstrained 
optimization we need to design the toll window balanced and push toll price to 
1p  or 2p . The next 
question is how long the toll window should be. To determine the optimal toll window length, we 
need to solve 
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  
  
 
 
 
 
0
1 1
min
2 1 2 1
N N
N
x N x N N
TC dx y dy
s s s


      
  
       
 
  
      
 (15) 
(15) is the total queuing delay and schedule delay of all commuters under the balanced toll window 
design. It is easy to see that total cost is a function of toll payers’ proportion  . For ease of 
exposition, we define the following two terms 
   A x x dx  ,    B x x dx   
It is obvious    B x A x . Since VOT is greater than zero, both  A x  and  B x  should be 
increasing functions with respect to x .   
 
From (15), we can obtain 
   
  
  
 
      
  
      
2 11 1
2 1 2 1 2 1
0
N N N B NB N N N N
s s s
dTC
d
N N
N N A N A
s s
         
         
 
   
   
  
 
       

  
 
 
 
When 0  , we can acquire 
    
 
  
 
 
 
2
1 1
2 1 2 1
0 0
N N
s s
dTC
B N B
d
  
     


 
    
    
Based on Lagrange mean value theorem, we can obtain 
     0B N B N     0 N   
obviously    0    and 
 
  
1 1
2 1 2 1
  
     
 
    
  
so we readily have 
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  0 0
dTC
d


   
When 1  , we can acquire 
   
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 
   
  
    
2 22 1
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d s s s

 
   
 
        

 

    
    
 
since it holds 
    
 
 
   
  
2 22 1
2 1
1
0
2 1
N
s
N NN
N N
s s

 
  
 
     

 

  
   
 
we readily have 
 1 0
dTC
d


   
The second order derivative with respect to  can be given by 
 
 
 
 
  
    
    
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2
2
2
1 1
2 1 2 1
2
2
N N
s s
d TC
N N N N N
d
N
N N N N
s
  
     
      


    
 
 

    
   
 

 
We can further obtain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
3 3 22
2
1 1
2 1 2 1
2 1
2 1
N N
s s
N Nd TC
N N
d s
 
   
  
    
  
 
   

    
 
 
which readily gives us 
2
2
0
d TC
d
  
As  TC   is a continuous function, these characteristics guarantee  TC   is a convex function 
within interval  0,1  so there must be a global minimizer * . It is apparent that within *0,   , 
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 TC   is a monotonically decreasing function and within *,1   ,  TC   is a monotonically 
increasing function. The optimal solution of unconstrained optimization is given by 
*  ,  
   * *1
2 1
N N N
p
s s
    
 
  
  
   
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6. Constrained Optimization Problem 
 
In previous section, we have discussed how to set the tolling scheme to achieve optimality with no 
constraint imposed on toll window length or toll price. But in real world, from political standpoint, 
the toll window length cannot be set too long and the toll price level cannot be charged too high, 
so now our job becomes how to minimize users’ time costs under these constraints. The toll 
window length constraint can be given by   N s l l N s   , where parameter l  is a pre-
determined toll window length limit. The toll price constraint can be given by p p , where 
parameter p  is a pre-determined toll price limit. 
 
The first problem we consider is how to achieve optimality with only time constraint on toll 
window length but no price constraint on toll level. Such a concern is reasonable since the morning 
commute flow only lasts for one or two hours, if we charge the whole commuting period, the 
congestion tolling will be pointless. In previous section, we have proved for any toll window, in 
order to achieve optimality, we need to make it balanced (    * *t t t t     ) and push toll 
level to 
1p . Since here we do not have any constraint on toll level either, we also need to make the 
toll window balanced and push toll level to
1p . The optimization problem can be given by 
   
 
 
 
 
 
0
1 1
min
2 1 2 1
N N
N
N N N
TC x x dx y dy
s s s


    
    
       
 
  
      
 
Subject to 
N
l
s

  
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Since within *0,   ,  TC   is a monotonically decreasing function, we can obtain the following 
result: if *N s l  , *  is the solution; if  *N s l  , in order to minimize the commuters’ total 
cost, we need to push toll window length to l , namely, l  is the solution. 
 
The second problem we consider is how to achieve optimality with both time constraint on toll 
window length and price constraint on toll level. Differing from the scenario with only time 
constraint, the balanced toll window design may not be feasible. We need to compare the 
unconstrained optimal solution with our constraints l  and p  to determine the tolling scheme. 
Totally four scenarios can be developed in this problem. 
 
6.1. Scenario one: *N s l  , *p p  
We can see this scenario is the easiest scenario, as the unconstrained optimal solution is covered 
by both the constraints, so *  and *p  are the solution. 
 
6.2. Scenario two: *N s l  , *p p  
In this scenario, although *p  is still within the range of our constraint, toll window length has 
exceeded the limit. The first step of the optimization is to design the toll window balanced and 
push toll window length to l , based on (4), if it holds 
   1
2 1
ls N
l p
s
  
 
  
  
   
 
since  TC   is a decreasing function on *0,   , the solutions are l  and  
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   1
2 1
ls N
l
s
  
 
  
 
   
 
If it holds 
 
   1
2 1
ls N
l p
s
  
 
  
  
   
 (16) 
we can see under the design of    * *t t t t     , based on (9) and (10), we need to charge 
the toll price as higher as possible, so the toll price should be taken as p . For same toll window 
length, if designed balanced, we have 
* Nt t
s
 
 
  

 
If designed as    * *t t t t     , we have 
* Nt t
s
 
 
  

 
Based on (9) and (10), when toll price is same, the balanced design will incur a lower individual 
cost, so the design of    * *t t t t      is ruled out. We only need to consider the balanced 
design. Now we need to solve: 
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Subject to 
N
l
s

  
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The total cost under the balanced design with toll price taken as p  is still a function of  . We 
can further obtain  TC   as 
     
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We can obtain 
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Since   0N   , we readily have 
0
dTC
d
  
This tells us  TC   is a monotonically decreasing function. To minimize  TC  , we need to 
push toll window length to l . 
 
We have considered the design of    * *t t t t     , now let us talk about the design of
   * *t t t t     . Based on (9) and (10), we can see for a toll window  ,t t  , if 2p  is lower 
than p , then the toll price should be taken as 2p ; if 2p  is greater than p , the toll price should be 
taken as p . Let us first consider the scenario of 
2p  lower than p . We need to minimize: 
       
 
 
  * * *
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1 1
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Subject to 
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  
  *
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t t p
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  
  
 
         
 (17) 
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
  
The total cost can be given as 
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The total cost can be treated as a function of  *t t   and  . We can acquire 
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which readily gives us 
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This tells us that under the design of    * *t t t t     , when t   is fixed, in order to lower 
the total cost, we need to stretch t

 as left as possible. 
We can also acquire 
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It is easy to see  
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This tells us for fixed toll window length, we need to move the toll window as left as possible. 
 
Based on (16), we can see when toll window length equals l , if we move toll window rightward, 
*t t   will increase and *t t  will decrease. When the toll window is moved rightward to a 
certain point, there must exist such  ,t t   which can satisfy 
 
  
  *
1
2 1
ls N
t t p
s
 
  
 
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 (18) 
At this time, if we continue to move toll window rightward, 
*t t   will become even longer. Since 
it holds 
 
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*
*
,
0
TC t t
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
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, 
the total cost will increase.   
 
If toll window length decreases (less than l ), in order to make   
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, 
based on (18), since  x  is a decreasing function, we need to increase *t t   and decrease *t t . 
Since we have  
 *,
0
TC t t

 


, 
we can see the total cost under such a toll window is higher than a toll window with same length 
of 
*t t   but total length of l . 
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These tell us to minimize the total cost under design of    * *t t t t      and constraint (17), 
we need to push toll window length to l  and charge a toll of p  or namely we need to find a toll 
window that satisfies (18). 
 
Now let us talk about the scenario with 
2p  greater than p . We need to solve 
        
  
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 
  
* *
*
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2
min ,
1
2 1
1
N
N
N
N p
TC t t x x t t x dx
s N
pN
y y t t y dy
s N


   
  
 
  
  
 

    

 
   



 
Subject to 
 
  
  *
1
2 1
N N
t t p
s
  
  
 
         
 (19) 
N
l
s

  
Total cost can be given by 
       
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    

 
We can acquire 
 
 *,
0
TC t t

 


 (20) 
This tells us with fixed t

, in order to minimize total cost, we need to stretch t

 as left as possible. 
It is also easy to obtain 
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 
 
*
*
,
0
TC t t
t t
 

 

 
 (21) 
This tells us with fixed toll window length, to minimize total cost, we need to move the toll window 
as right as possible. 
As    * *N s t t t t      , total cost can also be treated as a function of *t t   and *t t , or 
namely,  * *,TC t t t t   , we can obtain 
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     
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which readily gives us 
 
 
 
* *
*
,
0
TC t t t t
t t
 

  

 
 (22) 
This tells us with fixed t

, in order to minimize total cost, we need to stretch t

 as right as possible. 
 
As long as (18) holds (has solution), for a toll window whose critical toll price is bigger than p  
(
2p p ), we can always find another toll window whose critical toll price equals p  ( 2p p ) by 
stretching t

 rightward and/or moving the toll window rightward. Based on (9) and (10), it is 
shown that with same toll level and same length of toll window, a longer 
*t t   will incur a lower 
individual system cost. This tells us under constraint p p , the system cost of a toll window 
whose critical toll price equals p  is lower than that of a toll window with same length but whose 
critical toll price is greater than p (we can move the toll window with 2p p  rightward to obtain 
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a toll window with 
2p p ). If by only moving the toll rightward, we cannot find a toll window 
whose critical toll price equals p , we can first stretch t

rightward to certain point and then move 
it rightward, so finally we can obtain a toll window whose critical toll price equals p . Based on 
(22), (9) and (10), we can see that, if (18) holds, for a toll window whose critical toll price is bigger 
than p , there must exits a toll window whose critical toll price equals p  with less system cost. 
This tells us a toll window that satisfies (18) is better than any toll window whose critical toll price 
is bigger than p . 
 
If (18) has no solution or it holds that 
  
 
1
2 1
ls N
l p
s
 
  
 
  
      
, 
based on (20), (21) and (22), to minimize the total system cost, we need to push toll window length 
to l , take the toll price as p  and move the toll window as right as possible, or namely, the optimal 
toll window  ,t t  is  * *,t t l . 
 
Now in scenario two under (16) we have two sub-optimal solutions: the first one is to push toll 
window length to l , make it balanced and charge a toll of p ; the second one is to find a toll 
window that satisfies (18) or a toll window of  * *,t t l . We need to compare them to find the 
best one. Based on (9) and (10), it is obvious that with same toll level and same length of toll 
window, a longer 
*t t   will incur a lower individual system cost. For the balanced design, we 
have    
*t t l

 
  

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For the unbalanced design, we have  
*t t l

 
  

 
So it is straightforward that the unbalanced design has a lower system cost than the balanced design. 
Now our conclusion is that if (18) has solution, the optimal solution is a toll window satisfies (18); 
if (18) has no solution, the optimal solution is to push the toll window length to l  and move it as 
right as possible or namely, a toll window of  * *,t t l . Actually, when (18) has no solution, it 
implies the political constraints imposed on the tolling scheme are too strong. It implicates the toll 
window length limit is too short compared to the toll level limit or the toll level limit is too low 
compared to the toll window length limit. 
 
6.3. Scenario three: * *, N s l p p    
In this scenario, the unconstrained optimal toll window length is within our limit, but the toll price 
has exceeded the limit. In order to find the optimal solution under such constraints, the first step 
we should do is to solve 
 
   
 
1
2 1
N N
t t p
s
   
 
         
 (23) 
we denote the solution as   
 
If N s l  , for   , under the balanced design,    is the optimal solution, because (15) is 
an increasing function with respect to   on interval *,1   . Under the balanced design, for 
  , we have 
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   
 
1
2 1
N N
t t p
s
   
 
         
, 
so the toll price should be charged by p . With the toll price being p , under balanced design,  total 
cost is a decreasing function with respect to  , so the minimal cost will still be achieved by taking 
  . Now we need to think about the unbalanced design    * *t t t t     . We already 
proved in the section of unconstrained optimization that for the same toll window length, the 
balanced design will incur the minimal cost. So for the toll window with length N s , the 
balanced design with toll price being 
1p  is always better than the unbalanced design with toll price 
being 
2p . And for   , we can always find a dummy toll level bound p p  , then find a toll 
window that  can satisfy 
  
  *
1
2 1
N N
t t p
s
  
  
 
          
 
We have proved in scenario two that such a toll window is the optimal solution for problem with 
constraints    and p p .  
 
Based on these discussion, we can see the optimal toll window length should be N s , and toll 
price should be p , or namely a toll window that satisfies (23). 
 
If  N s l  , thus for every N s l  , we have 
   
 
1
2 1
N N
t t p
s
   
 
         
 
Based on the discussion of scenario two, the optimal solution is a toll window that should satisfy 
equation (18). Of course, if (18) has no solution, we can minimize total cost as much as possible 
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by making toll window unbalanced, pushing toll window length to l  and moving it as right as 
possible or namely a toll window of  * *,t t l . 
 
6.4. Scenario four: * *,  N s l p p    
In the last scenario, the unconstrained optimal toll window length and toll level have both exceeded 
the limits, it is obvious that 
   1
2 1
ls N
l p
s
  
 
  
  
   
, 
based on the discussion of scenario two, the optimal solution is a toll window that should satisfy 
equation (18). If (18) has no solution, we can minimize total cost as much as possible by making 
toll window unbalanced, pushing toll window length to l  and moving it as right as possible or 
namely a toll window of  * *,t t l . 
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7. Numerical Examples 
 
We use a numerical example to demonstrate what tolling scheme should be adopted under both 
toll window length and toll level constraints. We use the VOT setup adopted in Xiao et al.’s paper 
(2011). The travel demand is 100. Capacity of the bottleneck is 50. 0.609   and 2.377  . The 
preferred arrival time at work place is at 0 o’clock (the time points only serve as reference points). 
The difference is that the VOT function in our model is a monotonically decreasing function. 
Following is the VOT function setup: 
   0.128 100x x    
   0.078 100x x    
   0.3042 100x x    
Table 1 shows the unconstrained optimal tolling scheme 
 
Table 1: unconstrained optimal tolling scheme 
proportion of toll payers 39.91% 
toll window length 0.798 
tolling starting time -0.635 
tolling ending time 0.163 
optimal toll level 4.14 
peak hour stating time -1.5182 
peak hour ending time 0.488 
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We can see that under the unconstrained optimal tolling scheme the peak hour starts at -1.5182 
and ends at 0.488. We need to start charging the toll at -0.635 and stop charging at 0.163. The 
optimal toll level is 4.14. There will be almost 40 toll payers.  
 
If there is only toll window length constraint, e.g. 0.75l  , the optimal tolling scheme is shown in 
table 2. 
 
Table 2: constrained optimal tolling scheme with 0.75l   
proportion of toll payers 37.50% 
toll window length 0.75 
tolling starting time -0.597 
tolling ending time 0.153 
optimal toll level 4.48 
peak hour stating time -1.515 
peak hour ending time 0.485 
 
We can see the unconstrained optimal tolling scheme is no longer feasible, but with constraint only 
on toll window length, we still adopt the balanced toll window design. 
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If we have both toll window length and toll level constraint, e.g. 0.75l   and 4.3p  , the optimal 
solution is shown in table 3. 
 
Table 3: constrained optimal tolling scheme with 0.75l   and 4.3p   
proportion of toll payers 37.50% 
toll window length 0.75 
tolling starting time -0.587 
tolling ending time 0.163 
optimal toll level 4.3 
peak hour stating time -1.5817 
peak hour ending time 0.4813 
 
The toll window length constraint in table 3 is same with table 2 and the two schemes have same 
number of toll payers. But with the toll level constraint of table 3, we need to start charging the 
toll later. 
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Table 4, Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 give another four examples of constrained optimal tolling 
scheme under both toll window length and toll level constraints.  
 
Table 4: constrained optimal tolling scheme with 0.85l   and 4p   
proportion of toll payers 40.90% 
toll window length 0.818 
tolling starting time -0.651 
tolling ending time 0.167 
optimal toll level 4 
peak hour stating time -1.52 
peak hour ending time 0.48 
 
 
Table 5: constrained optimal tolling scheme with 0.75l   and 4p   
proportion of toll payers 37.50% 
toll window length 0.75 
tolling starting time -0.57 
tolling ending time 0.18 
optimal toll level 4 
peak hour stating time -1.524 
peak hour ending time 0.476 
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Table 6: constrained optimal tolling scheme with 0.75l  and 4.6p   
proportion of toll payers 37.50% 
toll window length 0.75 
tolling starting time -0.597 
tolling ending time 0.153 
optimal toll level 4.48 
peak hour stating time -1.515 
peak hour ending time 0.485 
 
 
Table 7: constrained optimal tolling scheme with 0.81l   and 4p   
proportion of toll payers 40.5% 
toll window length 0.81 
tolling starting time -0.6414 
tolling ending time 0.1686 
optimal toll level 4 
peak hour stating time -1.5203 
peak hour ending time 0.4797 
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8. Conclusions 
 
This thesis studied the morning commute problem with a peak period flat toll on a single bottleneck. 
We first solved the equilibrium of bottleneck model under different tolling schemes. We found out 
that, for any toll window, there exists a critical toll level over which capacity waste happens. Then, 
based on the individual cost, we proved that, in respect of total system cost, a tolling scheme 
without capacity waste is always better than a scheme with capacity waste. We also found out that, 
under toll window length constraint only, if the unconstrained optimal tolling scheme is infeasible, 
we should push toll window length to the upper bound, make toll window balanced and charge the 
corresponding critical toll price. Balanced means the part of the toll window before the work start 
time and the part after has equal monetary value. Under both toll level and toll window length 
constraints, if the unconstrained optimal tolling scheme is infeasible, whenever possible, a 
balanced toll window and its corresponding critical toll price can solve the problem; if the balanced 
design gives a critical toll price exceeding the upper bound of toll level, we can push the toll 
window rightward to make the tolling time start later, or namely make the toll window unbalanced, 
and charge the corresponding critical toll price of the moved toll window. 
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Appendix A. Derivation of Untolled Bottleneck Equilibrium 
 
As the bottleneck is not tolled, commuters can be divided into two groups. One has queuing delay 
and schedule early delay. The other has queuing delay and schedule late delay. We assume the x
th user has the schedule early delay and the y th user has the schedule late delay. Her cost is given 
by 
 
 
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*
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d s t t d s t t
C x t x x t t
s s
     
 
      
   
      
   
   
 
 
    *1
q
t
q
t
d s t t      (24) 
Condition (24) implies the x th commuters are cleared from 
qt  to 
*t . By setting ( , ) 0C x t t   , 
we can obtain 
 1
1
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
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Substituting  1 t  into ( , )C x t  gives us 
  *, ( ) ( )qC x t x t t    
The y th user’s cost is given by 
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Condition (25) implies the y th users are cleared from 
*t to 
qt  . By setting ( , ) 0C y t t   , we can 
obtain 
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Substituting  2 t  into ( , )C y t  gives us 
*( , ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1
q qC y t y t t y t t
 
  


   

 
Substituting 
1( )t  and 2 ( )t  into (24) and (25) can give us 
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Based on (26), (27) and the fact ( )q qs t t N   , we can readily obtain 
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If the x th commuter chose to come after t , he would have a cost of 
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Based on (26) and (27), we can obtain  
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This tells us at equilibrium, a commuter can choose to arrive at any time. No matter when she 
comes, she will have the same cost. 
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Appendix B. Derivation of tolled bottleneck equilibrium 
Here, we give the derivation of the equilibrium profile of capacity waste at both  and  as an 
example. 
 
Capacity waste happening at both  and : 
 
 
If there is capacity waste at both t

 and t

, it is very obvious that the mass arrival happens at t

. 
The first toll payer arrives after t

 and the last toll payer arrives before t

. Each traveler’s 
individual cost is given as  
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Figure 4: equilibrium profile of capacity waste at both t

and t

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 
 
      *,
2 2
q qt t t t
C m t m m t 
 
 
    
        
   
 
By setting  , 0C x t t   ,  , 0C y t t    and  , 0C z t t   , we can obtain 
   1 2
1
s
t t 

 

 
 3
1
s
t



 
Substituting  1 t ,  2 t  and  3 t  into to  ,C x t ,  ,C y t  and  ,C z t  gives us 
    *, qC x t x t t   
    *, yC y t y t t p    
    *, zC z t z t t p    
At equilibrium, no commuter can further reduce his individual cost by changing arrival time, so 
we must have 
     * *q yx t t x t t p      
     * *y qy t t p y t t      
      * *
2 2
q q
q
t t t t
x t t x x t  
 
     
         
   
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      * *
2 2
q q
q
t t t t
m m t m t t  
 
     
         
   
 
     * *y zy t t p y t t p       
     * *z yz t t p z t t p       
which readily gives us  
  
 y q
p
x
t t




 (28) 
  
 y q
p
y
t t




   (29) 
 * *y zt t t t     
  (30) 
From the fact that   
   
1
q q
s
t t s t t

  

 
   *
1
z y y
s
t t s t t

  

 
   *
1
z z z
s
t t s t t

  

 
we can further obtain 
 qt t t t 
      (31) 
 
* *
z yt t t t     (32) 
 * *
z zt t t t     (33) 
 * *
2 2
q q
q
t t t t
t t t 
 
     
         
   
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(32) and (33) readily gives us 
   * *y zt t t t     
The N th person is the indifferent user who can choose to arrive at any time at equilibrium. Based 
on (28) and (29), we readily have 
 
 y q
p
N
t t
 



 
this can give us 
 
 q y
p
t t
N  
   (34) 
The toll payers are cleared from 
yt  to zt , we can easily obtain 
z y
N
t t
s

   
The length of the peak hour can be given by 
  (35) 
which readily gives us 
  (36) 
     (37) 
Substituting (36) and (37) into (30) can give us 
  (38) 
Substituting (34) into (38) gives us 
   q q y z
N
t t t t t t
s
 
      
q q y z
N
t t t t t t
s
 
      
2q q y z
N
t t t t t t t
s
  
       
   * 1
2
q y z
q
N
t t t t
st t t    


   
    
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    
 
 
  
* *
11 2
1
2 2 2
z
y y y
t tp N
t t t t t t
N s
 
   
  


  
          (39) 
since    * *y zt t t t    , (39) can further be converted to 
   
 
      
1 2
1 1 2 1z y z y
p N
t t t t t t
N s
 
   
  
             (40) 
since 
z yt t N s  , (40) can give us 
 
   
 
 
   
1 2 2
1
1 1
z y
p N
t t t t
N s
  

    
        
 
 (41) 
Based on the fact    * *y zt t t t     and (41), we can obtain 
  
 
 
2
*
1 2 2 2 2 2 3
1 2 1 1
z y z
N
p s t t t t t t
s
        

     
 
     
              
 (42) 
The condition bottleneck has capacity waste on both sides is given by 
yt t t
   
z qt t t

   
Since  and , we can easily obtain  
 
Also from  and (35), we can obtain 
 
which gives us 
  (43) 
   * *y zt t t t    zt t
 * *zt t t t


  
qt t


y z q
N
t t t t t t
s
       
z y q
N
t t t t
s
   
57 
 
Based on (34) and (42), (43) can further give us 
  (44) 
As , we readily have 
 
which gives us  
 
From  and (31) , we can easily obtain 
 
this gives us  
which readily gives us 
 y
p
t t
N  
    
so we can further obtain 
  (45) 
As , we readily have 
 
this gives us  
 
*2z
N
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  
     
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*
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qt t t t 
    
qt t
 
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N
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    
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     
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*
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N
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N
t t t t
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so finally we need 
 
Now let us talk about the toll price’s range under different designs of toll window. 
Let the right side of (44) minus right side of (45) gives us 
 
When , we need 
and   
If it holds 
, 
we need 
 
We can also acquire ’s range as 
 
From the plotting of line 
 
 
and line 
, 
we can see we further need 
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s s

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   * * 0t t t t     
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and  
Based on (42), toll price’s range can be given by 
      * * *
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1 2
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p s t t t t t t
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If it holds 
, 
we need 
 
From the plotting of the line 
 
and the line 
 
we can see we further need 
 
The toll price’s range can be given by 
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N
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
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   
  
  
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  
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and 
 
  *1 2 10
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N
p t t t
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   

   
       
    
 
When    * *t t t t      , we need 
and  
If it holds 
, 
we need  
 * * *zt t t t t


     
From the plotting of line  
   * *
N
t t t t
s
 
 
      
and line 
   * * 0t t t t       
we can see we further need 
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
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N
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The toll price’s range can be given by 
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If it holds  
, 
we need 
 
From the plotting of the lines  
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we can see we further need 
 
The toll price’s range can be given by 
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When    * *t t t t     , the toll price’s range can be given by either forms of the unbalanced 
design. Just notice that the dots  are on the line of    * * 0t t t t      . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * *,t t t t  
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Appendix C. Lemma 1 proof 
 
Since there are many scenarios related with capacity waste, for simplicity, we only give one 
scenario’s proof as an example. Other scenarios’ proof can follow the same logic. 
 
 
Figure 5: equilibrium profile of toll window only with capacity waste at t

 
 
For scenario where capacity waste only exists at t

(figure 3), from t

 to 
yt , no queue exists at the 
bottleneck. From the indifferent user’s standpoint, the toll price can be obtained as the schedule 
early delay difference of her coming as the first toll payer and the first toll non-payer, respectively. 
Thus we have 
    y qp N t t     (46) 
From the fact the toll payer has schedule early delay if she is cleared before 
*t  and has schedule 
late delay if cleared after 
*t , we readily have 
 *
1
z y
y
t t
t t


 

 (47) 
 
q
t  t   
*
t  yt  mt  t

 
q
t   
Cumulative 
arrivals and 
departures 
z
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 *
1
m zt tt t

  

 (48) 
It is easy to obtain 
 
y
N
t t
s
    (49) 
Based on the definition of equilibrium, the toll non-payer can either arrive before t

 or join the 
mass arrival right after the last toll payer arrives. This gives us 
  * *
2 2
q q
q m
t t t t
t t t t 
 
     
          
   
 (50) 
Substituting (49) into (47) gives us 
 * *
z
N
t t t t
s

 
 
    
 
 (51) 
Substituting (51) into (48) gives us 
   *m
N
t t t t
s

         (52) 
Substituting (52) into (50) gives us 
 
 12 1
2 2
q q
N
t t t
s
  
  
 
    (53) 
Based on the fact q q yt t N s t t

     , (49) and (53), we can obtain 
 
 
1 2 2 2
1 1 1
q
N N N
t t t
s s s
    
  
      
  
 (54) 
The condition bottleneck only has capacity waste at t

 is given by 
yt t
  , 
which readily gives us 
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 
 
2 1
1 2
q
N
t t
s
 
 
   
 
 (55) 
From (46), (49) and (55), we finally can obtain 
 
    
 
1 1
1 2
N N
p
s
    
 
 

 
 (56) 
Based on the fact 
mt t
 , we can acquire 
  *
N
t t t t
s

          
which readily gives us 
 
 
* Nt t
s

 
  

 (57) 
From (49), we can further obtain 
 
 
*
y
N
t t
s

 
 

 (58) 
(57) and (58) tell us that 
   * * yt t t t      
For a toll window  ,t t    designed as    * *t t t t       with toll price of 1p , we have 
         
*
1 2
,
1 2
N
C x t x t t x
s
 
 
 
     
 
 
     * 1,C y t y t t p      
For a toll window only having capacity waste on t

, we have 
        
 
*,w
N p
C x t x t t x x
s N

  
  
      
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    *,w yC y t y t t p    
From (56), we can easily obtain 
      
 
 
*
1 2
,
1 2
w
N
C x t x t t x
s
 
 
 
     
 
 
If we let t t   and choose the same  , or namely let yt t
 , we readily have 
   , ,wC x t C x t  and    , ,wC y t C y t  
We can see the system cost of the y th user remains same, but under a tolling scheme without 
capacity waste, she pays less toll. The system cost of the x th user is also lower under a tolling 
scheme without capacity waste. This tells us for a toll window having capacity waste, we can 
shorten the toll window to the clearing period of toll payers, then reduce toll price to the critical 
level corresponding to the amount of the toll payer. With this new toll window, the total system 
cost is reduced and commuters pay less toll. This proves Lemma 1.   
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